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Secured Party's Right to Sue
Third Persons for Damage
to or Defects in Collateral
Harold R. Weinberg*
of Lexington, Kentucky

I. Introduction
The proverb "there is many a slip 'twixt the cup and
the lip" might have been written with the secured creditor
in mind.' Many tragedies may befall him to defeat his
expectations. He takes his security interest hoping for the
best, but preparing for the worst-nonperformance of the
obligation secured. If he does not carefully comply with
the Article Nine provisions concerning the enforceability
and perfection- of a security interest, he may ultimately be
unsecured. If his security interest is enforceable and perfected, it may turn out that some other party has priority
to the collateral. 3 Even if the secured party has priority,
the collateral may be worth less than expected. The purpose of this article is to explore the rights of a secured
party in the event that this tragedy befalls him as a result
of damage to the collateral caused by a third person or
because the collateral proves to be defective and, thus,
worth less than anticipated. Such rights may be particularly important when the collateral is uninsured through
oversight of the secured party or debtor or when adequate
insurance coverage cannot be obtained.
II. Secured Party's Claim
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code does not
contain a general provision dealing with the question of
when a secured party can sue a third person for damage to
or defects in the collateral. However, Article Two does indicate the circumstances under which a seller who has retained a security interest in goods for all or a part of their
price may sue a third person who damages them. 4 Since
the Code contains no cognate provision applicable to a

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank the Kentucky Law Journal for its permission to reprint as a portion of Part III of this article material
from Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Property: An Exploration from an Assignee's Perspective, 64 Ky.LJ. 49 (1975).
1. Regrettably, it was not. According to J. Bartlett, Familiar
Quotations 311 (14th ed. 1968) it originated prior to Article Nine, sometimes being attributed to the Greek poet
Homer.
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secured lender, the pre-UCC law, tempered by the philosophy and mechanics of Article Nine, would appear to control.
A. Secured Seller
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-722, captioned
"Who Can Sue Third Parties for Injury to Goods," provides that
Where a third party so deals with goods which have
been identified to a contract for sale as to cause actionable injury to a party to that contract
(a) a right of action against the third party is in
either party to the contract for sale who has
title to or a security interest or a special property or an insurable interest in the goods; and if
the goods have been destroyed or converted a
right of action is also in the party who either
bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale
or has since the injury assumed that risk as
against the other;
(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff
did not bear the risk of loss as against the other
party to the contract for sale and there is no arrangement between them for disposition of the
recovery, his suit or settlement is, subject to his
own interest, as a fiduciary for the other party
to the contract;
(c) either party may with the consent of the other
sue for the benefit of whom it may concern.
Section 2-722 applies only when the secured seller is a
party to and the goods sold are identified to the same con-

2. See Uniform Commercial Code (1962 Official Text) §§9203; 9-302; 9-401: 9-402 [hereinafter "UCC"]. Differences between this version of the UCC and the 1972 Official Text will be noted when significant.
3. See UCC §9-312(1).
4. See UCC §2-722. Concerning the relationship between the
provisions of Articles Two and Nine, see UCC §§2-102;
9-206(2).

tract for sale. In effect, the goods contemplated by this
provision are purchase money collateral. 5 The section is
also not applicable until the goods have been identified to
the contract. Prior to that time only the seller has a right
of action." Identification occurs when it is apparent that
the goods in question are the ones to which the contract
pertains. 7 After identification has occurred the seller may
8
sue, even if the goods have been accepted by the buyer,
if the seller has a security interest in the goods or any other
interest or status specified in section 2-722.9 The term
"security interest" is defined in Article One as "an interest
in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation."'10 Thus, section 2-722 applies to, but is not limited to, consensual security interests
in personalty created pursuant to Article Nine. It also applies to security interests arising under Article Two."
Section 2-722, which was intended to "extend somewhat the principle of the statutes which provide for suit
by the real party in interest,"' ' changed or clarified the
pre-Code law in a number of respects as it applied to secured sellers. It is not necessary that the buyer be in default in order for the secured seller to be a real party in interest with standing to sue for damage to the collateral.Y
The secured seller can sue for the total amount of damages to the collateral, even if those damages exceed the
value of his security interest, 14 and even if the risk of loss
passed to the buyer before the goods were damaged (as
will often be the case),' 5 because section 2-722 permits the
seller to sue, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary for
the buyer. 16 A recovery by the secured seller should bar
the buyer from bringing a second successful action against
the tortfeasor. 17 The seller can sue inhis own right for the
full amount of damages to the goods if he assumes the risk
of loss by permitting the buyer to cancel the contract after
conforming goods are destroyed while the risk of loss is on
the buyer.1 8 Section 2-722 also specifically permits the secured party to sue on the debtor's behalf, with the debtor's
consent, as well as on his own behalf. In such a case, the
5. See UCC §9-107. Presumably, pre-Code law would control
the seller's right to sue for injury to nonpurchase money
collateral. See UCC §1-103. See generally 3 L. Jones, The
Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales §1374
(1933) (hereinafter "Jones".); notes 32-41 and accompanying text infra.
6. UCC §2-722 Comment.
7. See UCC §2-501.
8. This was not always the case. See American Law Institute,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code 84-85 (1956) [hereinafter
"1956 Recommendations"]; State of New York, Report of
the Law Revision Commission 588 (1955) [hereinafter
"1955 New York Rpt."].
9. See Leist v. Schattie, 197 Pa.Super. 456, 179 A.2d 277
(1962).
10. UCC §1-201(37).
11. See UCC §§9-113 and Comment 1; 9-102. See generally
Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the
Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38
Bost.U.L.Rev. 571, 571-88 (1958).
12. UCC §2-722 Comment. See generally F. James, Civil Procedure §§9.2; 9.6 [hereinafter "James"].
13. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 582 §3(1959). Section
2-722 leaves intact the pre-Code rule that the contributory
negligence of the buyer is no defense to an action by the
secured seller. See id. §7.
14. See id. §9.
15. See UCC §§2-509; 2-510.

parties should agree in advance on matters such as the division of litigation expenses and the disposition of any
amount recovered.
Section 2-722 does not state whether a secured seller
with an enforceable but unperfected security interest is a
real party in interest for purposes of suing for damage to
the collateral. 10 Arguably, his unperfected status should
not of itself deprive the secured seller of standing because
perfection is relevant to the rights of a secured party in the
collateral as against the rights of third persons who might
also claim an interest in the collateral2 0 But the unperfected secured seller's right to any recovery should be no
better than his right to the collateral. Thus, if a secured
seller holds an enforceable but unperfected security interest which is defeated by another person who has a perfected security interest also obtained prior to the damage
to the collateral, the unperfected secured seller should also
be subordinate to this other person with respect to any
recovery obtained from the person who damaged the collateral. By a parity of reasoning, a secured seller who has
an enforceable and perfected security interest should be
subordinate with respect to such a recovery to any other
perfected secured party who also obtained a security interest in the collateral before it was damaged and who has
priority to the goods under an Article Nine priority provision. 21 Section 2-722 does not address these sorts of
problems.
Section 2-722 is also not clear concerning whether a
secured seller can be a real party in interest if his security
interest is not enforceable. In the case of a nonpossessory
security interest, nonenforceability is the result if the debtor did not sign a security agreement containing an adequate description of the collateral. If his Article Nine security interest is not enforceable, the seller will have no
Article Nine or equitable right to possess the goods if the
debtor defaults. 2 2 Thus, the question is whether the seller,
with no in rem Article Nine rights in the goods sold and
sans any other basis for standing under section 2-722,23 is
16. Concerning the fiduciary duty imposed by section 2-722(b),
see Greisler Bros., Inc. v. Packerland Packing Co., 392
F.Supp. 206, 17 UCC Rep. Serv. 1016 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
and Ninth Street East, Ltd. v. Harrison, 259 A.2d 772, 7
UCC Rep. Serv. 171 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1968).
17. 1955 New York Rpt. at 718. See generally note 37 and accompanying text infra.
18. UCC §2-722(a). See National Compressor Corp. v. Carrow,
417 F.2d 97, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 1240 (8th Cir. 1969). In
such a case, title will revest in the seller. See UCC §2401(4). Of course, if the goods are nonconforming, risk of
loss may never leave the seller. See UCC §2-510.
19. See UCC §§9-203; 9-303.
20. See UCC §9-303 Comment 1. See generally 2 Jones §447a.
The situation in which collateral has been damaged by a
third person should be contrasted with the situation in
which collateral has been acquired by a third person. In the
latter case, the secured party may be required to show a
perfected security interest to successfully sue the third
party transferee of the collateral in conversion. See UCC
§9-306 (2), Comment 3; Strevell-Patterson Finance Co. v.
May, 77 N.Mex 331, 422 P.2d 366, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1094
(1967).
21. See UCC §9-301(1) (a); §9-312.
22. See Clark v. Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 550, 14 UCC Rep. Serv.
501 (Tex. App. 1973); UCC §9-203 Comment 5.
23. Title and risk of loss will have often passed to the buyer
before the goods are damaged. See UCC § §2-401; 2-509;
2-510. Unsecured creditors usually are said to not have an
insurable interest in their buyer's property. See generally
R. Keeton, Insurance Law §3.4(c) (1971). But see note 27
and accompanying text infra.
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entitled to enforce a right to recovery for damage to the
goods. A negative response could turn on the definition of
"security interest" which is defined as "an interest in personal property .. . which secures payment or performance
of an obligation."24 An unenforceable security interest
arguably does not secure because the seller has no right to
the collateral. If he has no right to the collateral, it would
follow that he would not be entitled to sue for damages to
it. The seller qua unsecured creditor is, of course, "interested" in the collateral in a general sense because damage
to it could impair his chances for payment, but it can
hardly be said that the goods secure payment. A similar
problem of interpretation arose in the New York Law Revision Commission when it considered enactment of the
Code with respect to whether a seller with an unenforceable security interest has a insurable interest under the
Article Two provision which provides that "[t]he seller
retains an insurable interest in goods so long as title to or
any security interest in the goods remains in him.2..,25 The
Commission believed that this provision would deny an insurable interest to a seller with an unenforceable security
interest.26 On the other hand, there is an agrument which
can be made in support of an interpretation of section
2-722 which would give a seller with an unenforceable security interest standing to sue. This argument would attack the notion that standing under this section necessarily
turns on an in rem right in the goods sold. It has been
argued that an unsecured seller should have an insurable
interest in the goods sold to the buyer-debtor (and would
thus be entitled to sue for damage to them under section
2-722) because damage to them may be economically disadvantageous to him. 27 A buyer obtains a right to sue under section 2-722 when he receives a "special property"
which often will not give to him in rem rights in the goods
purchased. 28 As a technical matter, the argument in favor
of reading section 2-722 to require an enforceable security
interest for real party in interest status is more persuasive. 29 As a practical matter, any seller, secured or unsecured, can initiate a lawsuit for damage to the goods sold.
If it is determined that his alleged security interest is unenforceable and that he has no other basis for real party in
interest status under section 2-722, the buyer, who could
and probably would be a party under modern rules of
0
joinder, could take over control of the litigation. :1 The
tortfeasor could seek such joinder or related procedural
31
protection.

24. UCC §1-201(37).
25. UCC §2-501(2).
26. See 1955 New York Report at 464, 751; 1956 Recommendations at 54. See also Stockton, An Analysis of Insurable
Interest Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 17 Vand.L.Rev. 815, 821-27 (1964) [hereinafter
"Stockton"].
27. See Stockton at 826-27.. But see note 23 supra.
28. See UCC §§2-501; 2-502; 2-716.
29. It would follow that his security interest must also have
attached to the collateral in order for the seller to be a real
party in interest under §2-722 by virtue of a security interest in the goods sold. See UCC § §9-204; 9-203 (1972
Official Text).
30. See James §10. 12.
31. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 19; note 17 and accompanying text supra.
32. See UCC §1-103.
33. See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 599 §§2, 4 (1959); 2
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B. Secured Lender
In the absence of a UCC provision applicable to secured
lenders comparable to section 2-722, it is necessary as a
preliminary to consult pre-Code law concerning the question of when a secured lender can sue third persons who
damage the collateral. 32 The chattel mortgage provides
such a starting point. A chattel mortgagee's interest in the
collateral was conceptualized as title in some jurisdictions,
but as a mere lien in others. In title jurisdictions a mortgagee out of possession was often entitled to sue a third
person for damage to the collateral even if the mortgagor
was not in default.3 '. In lien jurisdictions, on the other
hand, the mortgagee's right to sue was not certain even
after a default by the mortgagor because the mortgagee
would not get title until after foreclosure and sale. Even in
lien jurisdiction, however, a postdefault right to possession
34
in the mortgagee might enable him to sue without title.
Also under pre-Code law the best view was that a chattel
mortgagee could sue a third party for the full amount of
damage to the collateral even though it exceeded the
amount of the debt. 35 Any recovery in excess of the debt
was required to be held in constructive trust for the mortgagor.3 6 There was also authority that a successful action
or settlement by the mortgagee for the damage to the col7
lateral was a bar to an action by the mortgagor.3
The pre-Code law concerning the right of a chattel
mortgagee to sue a person who damages the collateral
should not be applied in the context of Article Nine without considerable modification. Rather, it must be recognized that under Article Nine the secured lender has
neither "title" nor a "lien" in the sense that those terms
were used under the pre-Code law and that Article Nine
greatly diminished the importance of title generally.-" Instead, the lender with an enforceable security interest has
an interest which secures payment of an obligation. The
incidents of the interest, which may be operative before or
after default, must be determined through reference to
the security agreement and Article Nine."9 Under this approach it is clear that a secured lender on default can take
40
possession of the collateral, unless otherwise agreed. The
events which constitute default are determined by the parties and often include occurrences or failures which are
technical or insubstantial. Prior to default any secured
party may have, for his own protection, a sufficient interest
in the collateral to justify a consensual right to "police" or
otherwise assert dominion over the collateral. 4 ' It must

Jones §447a.
See id.
See id. §8.
See Harvard Trust Co. v Racheotes, 337 Mass. 73, 147
N.E.2d 817 (1958).
See generally 2 Jones at §447a.
UCC §9-202. See UCC §2-401.
See UCC §§1-201(37); 9-105(1)(h); 9-201.
See UCC §9-503.
Concerning defining default, see UCC §9-501(1). See generally 2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property
§43.3 (1965) [hereinafter "Gilmore"]. The security agreement could define default to include the occurrence of damage to the collateral of the debtor's failure to insure the
collateral. Concerning the secured party's need to police,
see UCC §9-205 Comment 5. There may be a predefault
right for the secured party to make collections. Id. §9-502
(1).

aiso De recognizeca in applying tlhe pre-Code law concerning a secured lender's right to sue in the context of Article
Nine that, absent default, the secured lender's "bundle of
rights" under the security agreement and to payment of
the debt secured may be worth less in the market place to
a potential assignee if the debt is undersecured because
the collateral is damaged and becomes worth less than
originally anticipated. These rights may also be worth less
to the secured lender if there ultimately is a default. Thus,
the secured lender's Article Nine interest in the collateral,
which commences when his security interest becomes enforceable and which continues until either payment of the
debt or until the lender completes foreclosure after default,
should be significant enough to constitute the secured
lender a real party in interest with standing to bring an
action against a person who damages the collateral before
or after a default by the debtor. Section 2-722 provides
persuasive analogic support for this proposition. Not all the
pre-Code doctrine should be abandoned; the public policy against multiplicity of actions should persuade courts
to continue to permit, if not require, that the secured lender sue for the entire damage to the collateral, pursuing recovery in excess of the debt secured as a fiduciary for the
debtor. If the secured party sues, any judgment or settlement should protect the tortfeasor from a subsequent
claim of the debtor. Here too, section 2-722 provides
strong analogic support.

Ill. Secured Party's Right to Succeed to Debtor's
Claim
Situations may arise in which a secured seller or lender
may be unable to sue, in his own right, a third person who
damages or is responsible for a defect in collateral. For
example, a court might come to the unfortunate conclusion that a secured lender is without "title" to the goods
and is, therefore, not a real party in interest with standing
to sue a tortfeasor. 42 As another example, the cause of action might be one which does not run to the secured
party as a matter of substantive law or the particular facts
of the case. Such causes of action would include an action
for breach of an Article Two sales warranty. The statutory
language which deals with these warranties expressly limits who may recover on them to a class of persons that
would probably not include a secured party. 43 In such situations the secured party might argue that a cause of ac-

42. Cf. Hoffman v. Snack, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 862 (Pa. C.P.
1964) ("[Pietitioner does not fall within this category of
permissible intervenors. It does not hold title to the demolished vehicle . . . "). This case is discussed at notes 8590 and accompanying text infra.
43. See UCC §§2-313-15; 2-318; In re Continental Trucking,
16 UCC Rep. Serv. 526 (M.D.Fla. 1974), discussed at notes
88-95 and accompanying text infra. See generally 1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code §2-318:3 (1970). The secured party might argue that he is a kind of purchaser to
whom the sales warranties should run. See UCC §1-201
(32), (33). But see id. §§2-102; 2-106(1). Query whether
a secured party is an "ultimate user or consumer" within the
meaning of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964).
44. UCC §9-306(1), (2).
45. See Restatement of Contracts §547 (1932); Weinberg,
Tort Claims as Intangible Property: An Exploration from

tion arising out of damage to or defects in the collateral
and any rights derived from the cause of action such as
rights under a settlement agreement, judgment, or in the
fund produced as a result of the settlement or
judgment are substitute collateral subject to his
security interest as Article Nine proceeds. Under Article
Nine, "[p]roceeds includes whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or
otherwise disposed of." Except where the Article provides
otherwise, "a security interest ... continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."'4 4 Such an argument would first have to demonstrate
that the particular cause of action is assignable. The Code
does not address this question directly, but as a matter of
extra-Code law it may generally be stated that all claims
arising out of contract are assignable and that tort claims
which are property related, as distinguished from those
45
which arise out of injury to the person, are assignable.
If the secured party can get over this hurdle, he would
next have to show that the particular cause of action
against a third party which he is claiming as proceeds under his security agreement is a type of property that falls
within the scope of Article Nine and can be the subject of
an Article Nine security interest. The reason for this is
that, except where Article Nine specifically provides otherwise,4 6 property rights that cannot pass through the Article's "front door" as original collateral cannot enter via
the "back door" as proceeds. 47 Finally, the secured creditor
would have to demonstrate that the cause of action falls
within the Article Nine definition of proceeds quoted
above.
A. Debtor's Claim and Derived Rights and the Scope of
Article Nine
All of the causes of action against third parties or derived rights which secured parties have sought to nursue as
proceeds in the reported cases, including actions for breach
48
of warranty, may be characterized as torts. Thus, it must
be determined whether tort claims are within the scope of
Article Nine. The same question must be considered with
respect to rights derived from a tort claim pursuant to a
settlement agreement, judgment, or a fund ultimately produced by the tortfeasor or his insurer.
The relevance of Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code to the assignment of tort claims is not immedi-

an Assignee's Perspective, 64 Ky.L.J. 49, 74-78 (1975)
[hereinafter "Tort Claims"].
46. "Proceeds" under Article Nine may include some property
rights which are not within the scope of Article Nine as
original collateral. See UCC §§9-104(k) 9-306(1), (4); 9104() (1972 Official Text). See generally Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W. Bank, 61 Wis.2d 671, 214
N.W.2d 33, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 1202 (Wis. 1974).
47. The onposite conclusion would lead to anomolous results.
Consider a properly perfected Article Nine security interest
in a motor vehicle and proceeds, the vehicle then being exchanged by the debtor for an acre of realty without the
permission of the secured party. Although the scope of Article Nine is expressly limited to personal property and fixtures, if "proceeds" were not limited to property which is
within the scope of the Article, the secured party could
claim a continuing Article Nine security interest in the
realty. See UCC §9-102(1).
48. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 635 (1971). The cases are
discussed at notes 85-94 and accompanying text infra.
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ately apparent. The Article broadly applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create
a security interest in personal property . . . "49 Thus, it
might seem to control a security interest in a tort cause of
action or derivative rights. However, rights "represented
by a judgment" and transfers "in whole or in part of...
any claim arising out of tort" are expressly excluded from
the scope of Article Nine on the theory that these intangibles do not customarily serve as commercial collateral. .I)
This decision by the Code's draftsmen appears correct
when viewed in light of the types of intangible property,
such as commercial accounts receivable, that are included
within the scope of Article Nine. Moreover, it is consistent with the pre-UCC personal property security legislation in many jurisdictions which also did not include tort
claims and judgments within its scope.' Excluding these
intangibles from Article Nine may also evince an intent
to have them handled on a state-by-state basis, each jurisdiction being free to apply its own public policies5n2 The
appearance that Article Nine is not relevant to security interests in rights arising from the commission of a tort is
further substantiated by its inapplicability "to a transfer
of an interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance . ."":
Although this exclusion was intended to apply
primarily to the assignment of life insurance policies,54 it
is arguably broad enough to exclude the assignment of a
claim tinder a casualty insurance policy arising out of a
tortious act by a third person. ' i
Although it appears that tort claims are outside the
scope of Article Nine, a closer analysis reveals that a
tort victim has the potential for obtaining property
rights, derived from the tort, which might be subject to
Article Nine. A typical sequence of events which could
follow the commission of a tort will serve to illustrate the
point. In considering the sequence of events, it must he
kept in mind that property can become the subject of an
Article Nine security interest in two ways: first, when the
security interest is created directly in the property, in
which case the property may be referred to as "original"
collateral; and second, when the security interest is imposed on the "proceeds" of original collateral.-" "Proceeds"
are defined by Article Nine as including "whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of."' 7 Moreover, it should he

recalled that a security interest in property in which the
debtor will have no ownership until a future time can be
granted under Article Nine.58
In the typical sequence of events, settlement occurs at
some point after suit is filed but prior to judgment. In the
settlement a tort victim obtains a contractual right to payment from the tortfeasor, or his insurer, which constitutes
a new form of intangible personal property derived from
the original tort claim. 50 When the tortfeasor or his insurer
issues a check to satisfy this obligation another form of
derivative property has come into existence-the victimpayee's rights on the check. Still another intangible derivative right is produced when the check is cashed or deposited-the rights in the fund. While the security assignment
of the original tort claim is not within the scope of Article
Nine, derivative settlement rights are excluded only if they
are "claim[s] arising out of tort."60 Therefore, these
rights could constitute original collateral within Article
Nine. Security interests in instruments, 61 such as checks,
are governed by Article Nine, and a tort victim's rights on
a settlement check could constitute original collateral if
not excluded as "arising out of tort." Additionally, a security interest in the monetary proceeds of the settlement
could be original collateral within Article Nine, subject to
this exclusionary language, if the funds are not deposited
in a savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with
a bank, savings and loan association, or like organization.
Security interests in these deposit accounts are removed
from the scope of Article Nine by another exclusionary
provision. 6 But even if the monetary proceeds could not
be "original" collateral within the scope of Article Nine because of this latter exclusion, once they go into such an
account they might constitute Article Nine "proceeds"
which are within the scope of Article Nine as are, arguably, the check and the settlement agreement rights."'
If Article Nine's exclusions do not embrace a security assignment of these present or future property rights derived
from a tort cause of action, then these nonexcluded rights
(and their proceeds) are subject to Article Nine through
its broad scope provision. 64 Consistent with this conclusion are the Code's comments which suggest that the scope
language should be broadly interpreted in keeping with
Article Nine's main purpose: to provide a comprehensive
scheme for all nonexcluded consensual security interests in

49. UCC §9-102(1).
50. See UCC §§9-104(h), (k), Comment 8. The exclusions
contained in §9-104 do not, however, exclude from Article
Nine security interests in all types of collateral which do not
customarily serve as commercial collateral. For example, a
security interest in a decedent's estate has been held to be
within the scope of Article Nine. See In re Bowen, 5 UCC
Rep. Serv. 261 (D.Ore. 1968). See generally 1 Gilmore
§10.7.
51. See generally 1 Gilnore chs. 7, 8.
52. See generally Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article Nine of the U.C.C.-Part IV: The Scope of Article
Nine, 79 Com.L.J. 79, 83 (1972). There are nonuniform
statutes relating to the assignment of judgments and causes
of action wvhich might have required modification or repeal
in order to avoid conflict with Article Nine. See Tort Claims
at n.197 and accompanying text.
53. UCC §9-104(g).
54. See UCC §9-104, Comment 7. See generally 1 Gilmore
§10.7.
55. See R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions Under

the Uniform Commercial Code §6-8, at 150-51 (1973)
[hereinafter "Henson"].
See generally Weiss, Original Collateral and Proceeds: A
Code Puzzle, 42 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 785, 803-04 (1967).
UCC §9-306(1).
See UCC §9-204(3). It will not attach and cannot be perfected, however, until the debtor has rights in the collateral.
Id. § §9-204(1); 9-303(1).
It thus becomes possible to sue on a contract for what
amounts to liquidated tort damages. See, e.g., Greenleaf v.
Minneapolis St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 151 N.W. 879, 881
(N.D. 1915).
UCC §9-104(k).
See UCC §9-105(1) (g).
Such deposit accounts are excluded from the scope of Article Nine by §9-104(k).
See note 46 supra.
See UCC §9-102. The relationship between the scope provisions of Article Nine and its proceeds provision is discussed at notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
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56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

personalty 65 However, the one reported case that relates
to this issue, Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bargain
City U.S.A., Inc.,66 provides contrary authority.
In Arkwright, an insurer had issued a policy covering
loss of rental income caused by property damage, including damage resulting from the impact of an aircraft. A
United States Navy jet had crashed into one of the insured
properties, causing a substantial loss of rental income. The
insured's claim under the policy was held in abeyance
pending his effort to recover from the United States by
means of filing a claim with the Navy. 7 The Navy and the
insured reached a settlement, and the Navy agreed to recommend to the Bureau of the Budget that the amount be
paid. At this juncture, the insured requested that the insurer advance him funds, pending payment by the United
States. The advance was made pursuant to an agreement
which provided that the insured would, at the insurer's request, execute and deliver such instruments as would authorize the United States to make payment directly to the
insurer; and that the insurer would pay to the insured any
amount received from the United States in excess of the
amount advanced.
After receiving the advance, the insured filed a petition
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. 68 The insurer
did not formally appear or file a claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding even though it was scheduled as an unsecured
creditor for the amount of its advance and the claim
against the United States was scheduled as an asset of the
insured. After the arrangement was confirmed and terminated, the insurer refused to accept as an unsecured
creditor a payment of fifteen percent of its total advance.
Subsequently, the United States appropriated the amount
of the settlement and the insurer instituted suit to recover
its advance, initially succeeding in requiring the insured
to deposit the fund into court.
The agreement between the insurer and its insured provided for an actual loan. The federal district court emphasized this,69 and the circuit court of appeals indicated
that the insured was to repay the difference if the amount
received from the government was less than the amount
advanced, and that the advance did not prejudice the insured's right to make a claim under the policy.70 Since the
transaction was a loan and not a payment pursuant to the
policy, the insurer, if it was to have a claim to the appropriated fund, could not claim rights through subrogation. 7 '
Instead, its rights would have to be realized through a consensual assignment or some other means.
If there had been a consensual assignment to the insurer,

65. See Comments to UCC §§9-101; 9-102; 9-104.
66. 251 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.Pa. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 701 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 825 (1967).
67. The claim was filed pursuant to the Military Claims Act of
1956, 10 U.S.C. §2733 (1959).
68. 11 U.S.C. §701 et seq. (1959).
69. 251 F. Supp. at 223.
70. 373 F.2d at 703.
71. See generally J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code §22-5 (1972).
The insurance policy in Arkwright provided that the insurer
could require the insured to assign all rights against third
persons to the extent payment was made by the insurer,
but no payment had been made under the policy.
72. 11 U.S.C. §701 et seq. (1959). The fact that the federal
government was the tortfeasor and potential obligor under

the rights assigned could have been either the insured's
tort action against the Navy, the derivative contractual
rights under the settlement agreement negotiated with the
Navy, or the derivative rights in the fund appropriated by
the government. As suggested, the assignment of such
derivative rights for security is arguably within the scope
of Article Nine, in which case Article Nine would apply to
determine the rights of the insurer qua secured creditor
in the Chapter XI proceedings.7 ' The district court did not
initally consider Article Nine because it found no assignment of any present or future property, but rather a mere
agreement by the insured to pay a debt from a designated
future fund. 7 Then, assuming that the insurer's claim
against the insured was valid, the court concluded that enforcement of the claim against the insured was barred by
the bankruptcy proceeding. Inexplicably, the lower court
then declared that the insurer's claimed lien was unperfected under the Uniform Commercial Code, a seemingly
unnecessary finding in view of the court's initial determination that there had been no assignment. 74 The court
ignored the exclusions from the scope of Article Nine discussed above.
On appeal, the Third Circuit questioned the pertinence
of the district court's declaration, stating in a footnote that
the transaction was "beyond the pale" of Article Nine because the claim arose out of a tort.75 The circuit court also
referred to the Article's exclusion of transfers to an interest
or claim in or under any insurance policy.7 6 It did not,
however, analyze the applicability of Article Nine beyond
these observations. Most of the opinion was devoted to the
determination that, assuming a non-Article Nine interest
had been created, it had been extinguished in the Chapter
XI bankruptcy proceedings when the insurer failed to as77
sert its equitable rights.
The fact pattern presented in Arkwright was not ideal
for determining the scope of Article Nine in relation to
tort-derived rights. It is clear from the facts that there had
been no security assignment prior to the commencement of
the bankruptcy proceedings, and, even assuming that there
was a consensual assignment, the loan agreement did not
specifically identify the collateral. However, even if rights
such as those under the settlement agreement or in the
future fund had been expressly secured prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, the court still should have concluded
that Article Nine was inapplicable. If the scope provisions
of Article Nine, with the accompanying official comments,
are construed to include certain rights derived from a tort
cause of action, the Code's exclusion of "any claim arising

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

the settlement agreement would not by itself remove the
assignment from the scope of Article Nine. See generally 1
Gilmore §10.7, ch. 13. On appeal the Third Circuit stated
that the equities of the parties would not be affected by the
Federal Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1959), but
would be determined by state law.
The parties authorized the district court to decide the case
as if they had filed summary judgment motions. The court
held that the fund was not impressed with a trust or equitable lien in favor of the insurer. 251 F. Supp. at 225-26.
This determination was not necessary for the Third Circuit
to hold against the insurer. See note 77 and accompanying
text infra.
251 F. Supp. at 228.
373 F.2d 704 nn.7 & 9.
Id.
Id. at 706.
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out of tort" would become meaningless due to the ease
with which it could be circumvented by assignment of
these rights. Placing these assignments outside Article
Nine's coverage does no great violence to the exclusionary
language, as such rights would never have existed but for
the commission of a tort. Exclusion is appropriate for it was
the more commercially familiar types of collateral and
transactions which concerned the Code's draftsmen and
which were the objects of their talents. The security assignment of a tort cause of action or derivative right was
an unfamiliar commercial transaction involving unusual
collateral. The tort claim exclusion, recommended in 1956
by the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
was intended to achieve greater clarity and precision in
defining the transactions "entirely" excluded from Article
Nine.7 8 Professor Gilmore, who was intimately involved in
the development of the Article, has stated that the exclusion reflects the notion that such assignments are "beyond
the pale with respect to a statute devoted to commercial
financing."79
If further evidence is needed to demonstrate that Article
Nine's draftsmen desired to leave the security assignments
of tort causes of action and derivative rights to extra-Code
law, it may be obtained by considering how the Article
would apply to the security assignment of a derivative
right. For example, a tort victim's rights under a contract
of settlement can be characterized under Article Nine as a
general intangible. 80 To perfect a security interest in a general intangible it is necessary to file a financing statement.
Under two of the Article's three filing alternatives, filing
would be in the office of the secretary of state or some
other centralized location. The third alternative requires
central filing and, in some situations, a filing in the county
where the debtor resides or has a place of business. 8t In
the case of tort-derived rights, however, it is debatable
whether any filing should be necessary. 8 -' Even assuming
that a filing requirement is warranted and litigation is
pending or has been settled, would not a filing in court be
more appropriate for giving public notice? It is unlikely
that either Article Nine's draftsmen or the legislators who
enacted the Code carefully considered these questions.,:

The foregoing analysis of the scope of Article Nine leads
to the conclusion that the draftsmen did not intend the
Article to apply to the security assignment of any rights
resulting from the commission of a tort, leaving such assignments to the general common law and equitable doctrine of assignments.8 4 This should be dispositive of any
question as to whether such rights can be Article Nine pro-

ceeds. Surprisingly, the three reported cases in which this
question has been presented have turned on the Article's
definition of proceeds without reliance on its scope provisions.
In the first case, Hoffman v. Snack,8 5 the secured party
attempted to intervene in its debtor's trespass action for
personal injuries and property damage against a defendant
who had allegedly destroyed the collateral, an automobile.
Through an oversight there was no insurance protecting
the secured party against loss of or damage to the collateral. The court held that the security interest did not make
the secured party a permissible intervenor and that Article
Nine's definition of proceeds does not extend to situations
where the collateral has depreciated in value through no
fault of the debtor. The opinion was silent concerning possible Article Nine scope problems.
The second case, In re Hix,86 reached the same general
result. In it the attorney for the perfected secured party
and the debtor had successfully negotiated a settlement
with the insurer for the third person who had damaged the
debtor's automobile. The debtor declared bankruptcy before the settlement was paid and the secured party claimed
the insurance proceeds in the bankruptcy proceeding. Unfortunately, its theory was not clearly presented. It claimed
the insurance proceeds as substitute collateral, but left it
to the court to discover on its own the Article Nine proceeds provision. The trustee challenged the secured party's
claim to the fund on the ground that the security agreement covered the automobile only. In holding for the trustee, the referee in bankruptcy reasoned that when the
debtor became bankrupt there had been no assignment of
his cause of action to the secured party and that there had
been no sale, exchange, collection, or other disposition of
the collateral within the Article Nine definition of proceeds. The referee noted the scope provisions excluding
the transfer of an interest or claim in or under any policy
of insurance and the transfer of claims arising out of tort,
but expressly refused to consider their relation to the problem as a question "not before the court."87
In the third case, In re Continental Trucking, Inc.,88 the
purchaser of a dump truck had commenced an action
against the truck's manufacturer, sounding in negligence
and breach of implied warranty, and seeking damages
arising from the faulty performance of the truck. An appeal was pending from a trial court judgment for the purchaser when it filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.
The trustee defended the appeal and the judgment was
affirmed with the resulting issuance of a check payable to
the purchaser, its attorneys, and the bank that financed the
purchase of the truck. The financer claimed the check as
Article Nine proceeds of its enforceable and perfected se-

78. See 1956 Recommendations at 257-58; State of New York,
Report of the Law Revision Commission 466 (1956).
79. See 1 Gilmore at 316.
80. See UCC §9-106. If a tort victim's right to payment was
not yet earned by performance, such as where the tort victim has failed to deliver an executed release from liability
required by the settlement agreement, then the collateral
might be characterized as a "contract right." See id. Under
UCC §9-106 (1972 Official Text) the term "contract right"
has been eliminated. Rights under a settlement agreement
must, under this version, be characterized as a general intangible.
81.. See UCC §9-401,

82. Under some circumstances a tort victim's rights under a settlenent agreement may be characterized as a contract
right. See note 80 supra. No filing is required to perfect a
security interest in an "isolated" assignment of contract
rights. See UCC §9-302(1) (e).
83. There are certain additional problems which could result
from the application of Article Nine to tort-derived rights.
See Tort Claims at 88-89.
84. See Tort Claims at 92-97.
85. 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 862 (Pa.C.P. 1964).
86. 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 925 (S.D.Ohio 1969).
87. Id. at 928.
88. 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 526 (M.D.Fla 1974).

B. Debtor's Claim and Derived Rights as Article Nine

Proceeds
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curity interest. 89 The court was initially troubled by this
claim because the damages in the suit included lost profits
and other elements which represented more than the proceeds from a hypothetical liquidation of the truck. However, the court assumed for the purpose of argument that
the damages were a partial substitute for the truck and
concluded, largely on the authority of Hix, that the bank's
security interest did not extend to the recovery in that the
suit for damages was not a disposition within the proceeds
definition. As in Hoffman and Hix, the opinion in Continental was not explicit as to the extent to which the Article
Nine formalities for creating and perfecting a security interest in proceeds had been complied with.""
All three of these cases, decided by courts of original
jurisdiction, are consistent in reasoning and result with a
more extensive and authoritative line of cases holding that
a secured party cannot claim as proceeds the debtor's
rights against the debtor's insurer or the fund created
through the settlement with such an insurer.!" If one reads
Article Nine's proceeds provisions as requiring a voluntary
disposition of the collateral by the debtor, there are two
bases for arguing that the claim and other rights generated
when the collateral is damaged by a third person are not
proceeds: the disposition was neither voluntary nor by the
debtor. 92 These provisions are even more troublesome
when the claim is for defects in the collateral which existed
before the security interest attached. In such a case it is
hard to find any disposition of collateral. Continental
properly found no merit in the argument that the lawsuit
brought after the defect becomes patent is a disposition. It
is not clear whether the secured parties in any of these
three cases made any attempt to proceed on their own
claim as real parties in interest. There was some indication
by at least one of the courts that it might have concluded,
incorrectly in the view of this writer, that such standing
was lacking if that issue was presented to it;!': however, it
was not. The fact that a debtor becomes insolvent and goes
into bankruptcy should have had no effect on the secured
party's standing to sue in his own right for damage to or
defects in the collateral occuring prior to bankruptcy bemay succeed only to the bankrupt's
cause the trustee
94
claims or rights.

89. Although none of the three opinions discuss the possibility,
it has been argued that Article Nine may require that proceeds be "received" by the debtor. See UCC §9-306(1);
(2). This requirement could have been met in all three
cases as the debtor initially received a cause of action, then
rights under a settlement agreement or judgment, and so
forth. See generally Henson §6-8 at 149, 153 n.18.; note 95
infra.
90. See UCC § §9-203; 9-306; 9-402. The 1972 Official Text
amended these provisions.
91. See, e.g., Quigley v. Caton, 247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 222

IV. Conclusion
The Uniform Commercial Code does not provide adequate guidance with respect to a secured party's right to
sue third persons for damage to or defects in collateral.
Section 2-722 does indicate that a secured seller of goods
can sue in his own right where a third party deals with the
goods sold so as to cause actionable injury to the seller.
However, this provision does not integrate clearly with
Article Nine concepts such as enforceability and perfection and does not deal with goods in which the seller has
retained a nonpurchase money security interest. The lack
of a cognate provision applicable to the secured lender
forces reference to doctrine which originated prior to the
development of Article Nine and which, therefore, does
not reflect the Article Nine concept of the secured party's
bundle of rights called a security interest. The Code also
does not provide adequate guidance with respect to the
secured party's right to succeed to his debtor's claim. This
is probably because the draftsmen never carefully considered the issue. If future draftsmen ever do address the
problem, thought will have to be given to whether tort
claims and derived rights should be types of personalty
within the scope of Article Nine (and to closely related
questions such as the proper method for perfecting a security interest in such property). If an affirmative answer
is forthcoming, then thought must also be given to whether
all or some portion of the debtor's claims resulting from
damage to or defects in the collateral caused by a third
person should be proceeds subject to a secured party's security interest. A decision not to subject such claims may
be difficult to justify conceptually, 5 particularly since the
1972 Amendments to Article Nine redefine proceeds to include "[i] nsurance payable by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral ...except to the extent that it is payable to
'
a person other than a party to the security agreement." "
In the meantime, it is hoped that this article will provide
some guidance for the secured party who discovers that
his security is worth less than expected as a result of damage to or defects in the collateral not compensated by insurance. fl

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

A.2d 571 (R.I. 1966). But see Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Co.
v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 1407 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). See generally Henson §6-8.
Cf. Henson at 148.
See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
See 11 U.S.C. §110(1959).
See Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article Nine
of the UCC, Part II: Proceeds, 77 Com.L.J. 12, 13 (1972).
UCC §9-306(1) (1972 Official Text). The draftsmen had
the debtor's insurance on the collateral in mind. See generally!TL"ort Claims at 91-92.
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